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ABSTRACT 
The apparel export industry in Ethiopia began modestly in the 2000s, but increased 
significantly by the mid-2010s and will continue to do so in the coming years, 
positioning Ethiopia to be an important supplier country in the globalized apparel 
industry. This paper provides an overview of the emergence and evolution of the 
apparel export sector in Ethiopia. It argues that the EPRDF government’s pro-active 
industrial policy played an important role in the development of the sector. While 
foreign firms are an important driver behind the growth of apparel exports, there are 
also locally owned firms exporting apparel, which makes Ethiopia distinct from most 
other Sub-Saharan African apparel exporter countries. Ethiopian-owned apparel firms 
exhibit diverse ownership patterns, including state-owned, party-owned, and private 
sector-owned firms. The first phase of industrial policy particularly focused on 
incentivizing local investment in apparel production for export while later phases of 
industrial policy shifted the focus to attracting foreign direct investment, in order to 
boost exports and generate employment more quickly as well as bring knowledge and 
global networks into the country. Despite the focus on exports, the EPRDF government 
simultaneously has pursued import-substitution policies in the textile and apparel 
sector, which has helped the development of locally owned apparel firms by subsidizing 
the cost of learning to export as well as building a national supply chain from cotton to 
textile to apparel. The challenges for the government’s industrial policy approach is to 
retain the focus on local firms given their important role in productive transformation 
and to ensure incentives and support for local firms to export, and through this to 
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The apparel export industry in Ethiopia began modestly in the 2000s, but increased 
significantly by the mid-2010s and will continue to do so in the coming years, 
positioning Ethiopia to be an important supplier country in the globalized apparel 
industry. From around $1 million in the mid-2000s, apparel exports climbed to $12 
million in 2010 and up to $70 million in 2015. Textile and apparel exports together 
were $117 million in 2015, accounting for 23% of total manufacturing but only 3.5% of 
total exports, and employing around 55,000 people.1 This take off of apparel exports 
was due largely to two waves of foreign direct investment. The first was Turkish 
investment from around 2008-09, as a result of close diplomatic relations, and the 
second wave of investment starting in the mid-2010s driven by Asian transnational 
apparel companies from India, Korea, Taiwan and Sri Lanka, as transnational producers 
and global buyers sought out new low cost countries. The early interest in Ethiopia was 
consolidated and channeled into specialized apparel and textile industrial parks, with the 
first park starting operations in 2015/16 and additional parks planned to start operating 
in 2017 and 2018.  
 
What explains Ethiopia’s rise as an apparel exporter? Attractive features of the country 
are its comparatively low labor as well as electricity and water costs, and the duty-free 
access it enjoys to the EU market under Everything But Arms (EBA) and to the US 
market under the African Growth and Opportunities Act (AGOA).2 If these preferential 
trade agreements disappeared at this early stage, industrial expansion in the apparel 
export sector would collapse, as the US and the EU are the main end-markets. Yet, all 
Sub-Saharan African countries have these trade preferences, and in the case of the EU 
also all other least developed countries. The factors that set Ethiopia apart are the 
government’s pro-active industrial policy targeting the apparel and textile sector 
combined with the decisions of some EU and US buyers to convince their core suppliers 
to invest in, or source from, Ethiopia. These global buyers favor Ethiopia because it is a 
new apparel location alternative to Asia, where most sourcing is concentrated. In 
addition to low (labor) costs, Ethiopia is an alternative because of its political stability 
and safety (although recent protests tarnished this image somewhat) and the foundation 
                                                            
1 UN Comtrade 2017, International Merchandise Trade Statistics, United Nations Statistics Division; 
Ethiopian Textile Sector Profile 2016, Ethiopian Textile Industry Development Institute, January 2016. 
2 In August 2001, Ethiopia became one of 39 Sub-Saharan African countries to benefit from AGOA, 
which grants duty free and quota free access to the US market. In February 2001, the European Union 
Council adopted the EBA, which granted duty free access to imports of all products for 49 Least 
Developed Countriess, except arms and ammunitions. 
 




of a national supply chain from cotton to textile to apparel that can be built upon to 
make production vertically integrated within Ethiopia, as well as the pro-active role of 
the government. Even though the national supply chain is still nascent in Ethiopia, it has 
significant potential. 
 
The objective of this paper is to give an overview of the emergence and evolution of the 
apparel export sector in Ethiopia. It is argued that the EPRDF government’s pro-active 
industrial policy played an important role in the development of the sector. Industrial 
policy targeting the textile and apparel sector can be divided into three phases, with 
industrial policy evolving over time based on mistakes and learning experiences from 
previous phases. While foreign firms are an important driver behind the growth of 
apparel exports, there are locally owned firms producing textile and apparel for export, 
which makes Ethiopia distinct from most other Sub-Saharan African apparel exporter 
countries.3 Ethiopian-owned apparel firms exhibit diverse ownership patterns, including 
state-owned, party-owned, and private sector-owned firms. These local exporting firms 
exist primarily because the first phase of industrial policy focused on incentivizing local 
investment in apparel production for export. However, later phases of industrial policy 
shifted the focus to attracting foreign direct investment, because foreign firms already 
have the requisite knowledge and global networks and thus can export large volumes 
and generate employment quickly. The third phase of industry policy involved 
channeling foreign investment into specialized industrial parks, supporting locally 
owned firms to also buy sheds in the parks, and fostering linkages between local and 
foreign firms. While this phase of industrial policy acknowledges the importance of 
linking foreign and local firms in order to facilitate learning and capability building 
among local firms, it remains to be seen how this policy will be implemented, especially 
if specific measures to support such linkages and local learning should go against the 
interest of foreign investors.  
 
The Ethiopian-owned firms have struggled to enter and remain competitive in apparel 
global value chains.4 As a result, many of them have used production for the domestic 
market as a strategy to ensure some stability and profits, while trying to learn and 
become efficient in production for export markets. The domestic market in textile and 
apparel remains protected, which is an explicit government strategy to allow import 
substitution in combination with promoting exports. It combines the two strategies by 
leaving the domestic market protected but offering favorable incentives only to local 
firms that also export.    
 
                                                            
3 For a discussion of the limited local investment in the apparel export sectors in Kenya, Lesotho and 
Swaziland, see Staritz and Frederick (2016). 
4 A detailed discussion of the technological capabilities of Ethiopian-owned firms in apparel exporting is 
presented in Whitfield and Staritz (2017). 
 




This sector overview paper is based primarily on new empirical material collected in the 
course of three research trips to Ethiopia in November 20155, June 2016, and 
November-December 2016. We interviewed 40 textile and apparel firms, including 26 
out of the 48 Ethiopian-owned firms (which includes all 14 local firms exporting 
apparel and made-up textiles6) and 14 foreign-owned firms (including one joint venture 
firm). In addition, institutional interviews were conducted with the Secretary of the 
Ethiopian Textile and Garment Manufacturers Association  (the industry association for 
locally owned firms); several officials at the Ethiopian Textile Industry Development 
Institute (the government sector agency), including the Director General, the Technique 
Sector Deputy General, and the Cotton and Textile Marketing Directorate Director; an 
official of the Industrial Parks Development Corporation; a special adviser to the Prime 
Minister, advising on the textile and apparel sector and being Chair of the Industrial 
Parks Development Corporation; and a researcher at the Ethiopian Development 
Research Institute focusing on manufacturing exports and industrial policy. 
 
The paper starts by explaining how the foundation of the apparel export sector was laid 
through import-substitution industrial policies and a gradual privatization process in the 
1990s and 2000s. The next three sections present the three phases of industrial policy 
focusing on export promotion, explaining the emergence of locally owned firms, the 
two waves of foreign direct investment, and the creation of the industrial parks. The 
fifth section provides an overview of the sector as it looked in 2016, before the latest 
apparel industrial parks commenced operations in 2017. It presents data on exports and 
imports, main end markets and types of export products, and an overview of types of 
firms. Section six provides a detailed mapping of the locally owned firms, including 
local exporting firms as well as local firms focusing on the domestic market.  
 
 
The Foundation: import substitution industrialization policies and gradual 
privatization 
 
The industrial textile and apparel production in Ethiopia began in the Imperial era after 
the Second World War, when the government of Haile Selassie encouraged foreign 
direct investment in industries with the explicit goal of import substitution. The 
government’s policy gave many incentives to foreign investors and largely ignored local 
                                                            
5 This first research trip was in the context of a research project conducted for the International Centre for 
Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD) by one of the authors, together with Mike Morris and 
Leonhard Plank. The outcome of this project was a report for ICTSD (see Staritz et al. 2016).  
6 There are 18 local exporting firms, but four of these firms only export yarn and/or fabric. In this study, 
we focus only on firms exporting apparel or made-up textiles. 
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investment, and thus most of the manufacturing firms including, textile and apparel, 
were owned and operated by foreigners during the Imperial era.7  
The socialist Derg military government (1974-1991) nationalized almost all private 
industries when it came to power in 1974. Private investments were strongly restricted 
and state-owned enterprises came to dominate the manufacturing sector, but the focus of 
industrial policies remained import-substitution. The Derg government established more 
textile and apparel firms, with the additional objective of creating employment. As part 
of the import substitution strategy, the textile and apparel sector was protected by high 
tariffs on imported fabric and apparel.  
By the early 1990s, the public textile and apparel sector consisted of 14 firms engaged 
in the spinning, weaving, dyeing, and finishing of cotton and other fibers and the cutting 
and sewing operations to produce apparel. Eight firms were integrated textile factories, 
two dealt primarily in yarn, and four were in apparel manufacturing.8 There were 
another four public enterprises in cotton production. 
After winning the war against the Derg regime in 1991, the government of the Ethiopian 
People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) switched to more market-led 
economic policies, but it did not pursue rapid deregulation, liberalization, and 
privatization, as most African countries did in the 1980s and 1990s under conditions in 
structural adjustment loans from the World Bank and IMF. In contrast, the EPRDF 
government pursued a gradual economic reform program. It was able to do so because it 
had a clear position in negotiations with the Bank and Fund that it wanted to keep the 
‘commanding heights’ of the economy guarded from full liberalization, and there was a 
consensus on this position among top government officials (Weis 2016: 191-196). The 
government had greater leverage in the negotiations around structural adjustment 
lending because it was willing to walk away from the table (and thus the financing), 
unlike most African governments. This position was also made possible as Ethiopia had 
a much less severe external debt and macroeconomic crisis during the time of the 
negotiations (Whitfield 2009: 336-7). For example, the EPRDF government walked 
away from the IMF in 1996 and 1997 because it refused to meet IMF demands for 
greater liberalization and privatization in return for further financing. The most well 
known example is the government’s refusal to liberalize the financial sector, which still 
does not allow foreign investment in its banking sector.  
Therefore, Ethiopia did not experience the rapid trade liberalization that led to de-
industrialization in many African countries. The EPRDF government undertook six 
7 Report on the Ethiopian textile and apparel industry, 2014, accessed from the Ethiopian Textile and 
Garment Manufacturers’ Association, Addis Ababa, June 2016. 
8 Ethiopia Textile Sector Study: Final Report, Chemonics International, 1996, produced for USAID Addis 
Abba office. 
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rounds of general tariff reforms between 1993 and 2003 that gradually reduced the 
maximum tariff rate from 230% to 35%. In the privatization process, state-owned 
enterprises considered strategic by the government were excluded, and the selling of 
public enterprises was guided by the objective of finding viable investors. The 
privatization process was also important as it saw the entrance of Mohammed Al-
Amoudi, a Saudi billionaire with Ethiopian roots and owner of MIDROC group of 
companies, as a major investor in the Ethiopian economy (Weis 2016: 204). During the 
second half of the 1990s, Al-Amoudi’s diversified business group acquired twenty 
privatized enterprises, which represented only 13% of the public enterprises put up for 
sale but almost 80% of the total value of the public enterprises. The role of MIDROC in 
the privatization process was just the beginning, as the business group also entered 
many greenfield investments in Ethiopia, including in the textile and apparel sector as 
well as floriculture exports. 
The government’s position on economic liberalization and the gradual pace of the 
reforms had important consequences for the evolution of the textile and apparel sector. 
The state-owned textile and apparel firms were gradually sold to local and foreign 
investors. Table 1 summarizes information on the state-owned firms in textile and 
apparel, when they were sold and who bought them. Some firms were sold, and then 
reacquired by the government if the investor did not meet the terms of the privatization 
contract in terms of performance. For the two textile factories for which the government 
could not find buyers (Bahir Dar Textile and Kombolcha Textile), the government 
financed major renovations of the equipment and pushed the factories to increase 
exports of yarn, fabric, and made-up textiles such as bedsheets.9 The continued 
protection of the domestic market with a 35% tariff on imported fabric and apparel, and 
a further 10% surcharge and 10% excise tax, provided firms with a safe haven. All of 
the privatized firms that began exporting also engaged in production for the domestic 
market, because it provided an important source of capital accumulation while the new 
investors renovated the old state-owned firms, reducing the amount of losses they 
incurred.  
At the same time though, the government pushed the private investors leasing or buying 
the textile and apparel public enterprises to enter the export market. Some of the 
privatization contracts included an agreement that the investors would export a certain 
percentage of their production after rehabilitating the firms. The export push within the 
privatization process was part of the government’s larger export promotion strategy that 
was adopted in the late 1990s and strengthened through the first Industrial Development 
Strategy of Ethiopia in 2002-03. This Strategy emphasized the need to privatize the 
public textile and apparel enterprises, or enter joint ventures with foreign investors on 
9 It was reported on some online Ethiopian news sources in January 2017 that these two state-owned 
enterprises had been sold to Tiret Corporate, the endowment of the Amhara National Democratic 
Movement party, but we have not yet confirmed this. 
 




contract management arrangements, as a means to address the firms’ productivity and 
management problems, as well as bring technology, market and management skills and 
knowledge into the country.10 The government clearly wanted to use privatization to 
make these firms profitable, to enter export markets, and to bring wider benefits to the 
sector. The government was only marginally successful in achieving those objectives. 
Not many foreign investors were interested, and in the case of Addis Garments and 
Bahir Dar Textiles, the foreign investors left and local investors or the state took over. 
Furthermore, some of the firms are no longer exporting, and others are only exporting a 































                                                            
10 Industrial Development Strategy of Ethiopia, Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, Addis Ababa, 
2002, English version, p.17.  
 
 




Table 1 Privatization of State-owned Textile and Apparel Firms 
SOE name Year  
privatized 
Investor Status Exporting 









Italian investor, 2007-13 exporting 
garments CMT. One buyer, Italian, 
different end markets.  
Sold to the owner of an existing local 








2004/05 Local Produces garments for domestic market. 
Owner Local has a separate garment factory 




2005 Local Exporting from 2005 to 2010, but then 
stopped because lost buyers. Only 














Turkish investor, leased factory for 2 years.  
Closed down spinning department. 
Rehabilitated knitting and dyeing. 
Expanded garment factory. Exporting CMT 







2011 Foreign Joint venture between government and 












Ran into problems. Government took over. 
Israeli firm bought majority share. Firm is a 
player in global garment industry, with 
factories in Asian countries. Renovating 





2010/11 Local Sold to Dukem Textile. The company 
produced bed sheets and foam mattress 
covers, school uniforms, workers’ uniforms 
and threads. Undertook rehabilitation and 











 Still SOE Leased to Turkish investors in 2005/06, but 
government terminated the contract and 
then invested in major renovation between 




 Still SOE 2011-2012, government invested in a major 




2007 Local  Local owner struggled with financing for 
renovation. Produce yarn and woven fabric.  
Yes. Some 
yarn 
Edget Yarn & 
Sewing Thread  








Source: Collated from various interviews with firms during research in Ethiopia in 2016. Years of 
privatization and buyers confirmed with privatization data from the Ethiopian Privatization and Public 








Government encouragement of apparel exports: industrial policy phase 1 
 
From the first Industrial Development Strategy in 2002-03 onwards, the EPRDF 
government identified textile and apparel as a priority sector. The Industrial Strategy 
was part of a broader shift in government policy in 2001 towards an approach that 
recognized the need for active industrial policy to get the country out of its ‘low 
productivity trap’, which markets could not do on their own (Weis 2016: 226-233). The 
Industrial Development Strategy identified a number of sectors for targeted government 
support, including textile and apparel. Prime Minister Meles Zenawi was the intellectual 
driver behind this approach (de Waal 2012). Interviewees for this research indicated 
several times that it was Zenawi who decided to make the textile and apparel sector a 
priority, because he knew that the sector historically had been a first step in economic 
transformation and industrialization in almost every now industrialized country.  
 
The first phase of industrial policy included preferential credit and access to land 
schemes. Under the preferential credit scheme, the state-owned Development Bank of 
Ethiopia (DBE) provided local investors with a loan covering 70% of the investment as 
stipulated in the project plan, with the investors providing the remaining 30% in cash or 
in kind. Regarding the latter, local investors buit their factories and then used the value 
of the factories as the equity contribution to their project loan. The value of the factories 
were assessed by DBE. The loan was provided at a 7.5% interest rate, for 8 years with a 
two-year grace period. Local investors used the loans to buy equipment, vehicles, and 
other materials for production as well as for working capital. The firms also received 
exemption from company tax for several years. Under the access to land scheme, the 
government provided access to land at favorable lease rates, particularly in the new 
Saris and Lafto industrial villages created in the outer areas of Addis Ababa.11 Access to 
land was important, as the EPRDF government decided to maintain the state ownership 
of land, implemented under the Derg regime, and thus land could only be leased from 
local and regional government authorities for up to 99 years. 
 
Between 2004 and 2006, Ethiopian investors established around 15 apparel export firms 
as a direct result of these government incentives. Two firms were established in the 
early 2000s by Ethiopia diaspora as a result of direct linkages with particular US buyers 
and in response to the establishment of AGOA. All of these local investors came from 
various occupations and none of them had previous experience in textile and apparel 
production. It is likely that some of them had political connections to the EPRDF 
government or were at least considered politically loyal. Several of them had a direct 
connection to the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF). 
 
                                                            
11 Later some of these firms and other new entrants moved to Gelan, Sendafa, and Dukem, areas not far 
from Addis Ababa. 
 




Most of these local investors did not fare well in the apparel export sector. The majority 
of firms that took the DBE loan could not repay it, and their loans had to be 
rescheduled. By 2016, some firms had closed down, and some had switched to 
producing for the local market mainly or entirely. Others were still exporting, with 
varying degrees of success (see Whitfield and Staritz 2017). Although the incentives 
were predicated on exporting, one of the local investors did not enter exporting right 
away but rather built up experience in production for the domestic market and only in 
2016 was positioning his firm to enter the US and European markets. One firm had 
temporarily stopped exporting but was searching for new buyers. In sum, only 6 of the 
15 initial investors were actually exporting some proportion of their production in mid-
2016, and only two of these firms were exporting 100%. 
 
Buyers from the US and EU favored Ethiopia as a new frontier in apparel sourcing, 
visiting Ethiopia to screen locally owned firms as potential suppliers or “convincing” 
their core suppliers to invest in, or source from, Ethiopia (Staritz et al. 2016). This 
active role stemmed from the importance of maintaining a serious presence, or 
searching for new low cost production sites, in Africa so as not to concentrate all their 
buying activities in Asia, particularly in the context of cost increases and compliance 
issues in the main Asian supplier countries. A first prerequisite for considering a 
country for sourcing is political stability, and here Ethiopia outperformed many Sub-
Saharan African countries. Therefore, many buyers visited Ethiopia to see if it met the 
criteria for being a new sourcing location. Most prominently, H&M opened a sourcing 
office in 2012, which boosted the international image of the Ethiopian textile and 
apparel sector.  
 
Other buyers, however, did not pursue Ethiopia as a sourcing location given the low 
development of capabilities among local firms, as well as low comparability on 
infrastructure and total price. Although labor costs were very low, with all costs counted 
together, the prices in Ethiopia were not comparable to locations such as Bangladesh. 
The price issue seems to have been a larger problem for European buyers, which 
compared Ethiopia on a one-to-one basis with prices in Bangladesh. A further problem 
was that European buyers preferred full package suppliers, but most locally owned 
firms in Ethiopia could only fulfil assembly functions, or Cut-Make-Trim (CMT), and 
could not undertake the responsibilities and financing entailed in importing the raw 
materials themselves. For example, H&M struggled to find suitable suppliers among 
local firms, given their tight price and other sourcing conditions, including full package 
supply. For US buyers, prices in Ethiopia were more advantageous than in Asian 
supplier countries, which had to pay high tariffs for synthetic apparel products (up to 
32%) while Ethiopia had duty free access under AGOA. This is an important reason 
why Champro, Cintas and Superior Uniform, which specialize in workwear and 
sportswear production with polyester-cotton blends, are sourcing from Ethiopia, 
including locally owned firms.  
 





The first phase of industrial policy also included encouraging foreign direct investment; 
however, it was rather small-scale in the early and mid-2000s, involving a few 
individual entrepreneurs in textile production, largely from India and Pakistan. As of 
2016, there was one Indian (Mahavir Textile) and two Pakistani textile firms (Al Mehdi 
and Al-Asr) left, with the latter two expanding into apparel production in recent years. 
These firms largely produced for the domestic market; the government tried to push 
them to export, but with limited success (Staritz et al. 2016). 
 
A second, more substantial, wave of foreign direct investment occurred beginning in 
2008/09 from Turkish investors producing textiles, with some investment in apparel 
production in response to the government’s focus on exports and the higher export 
competitiveness of apparel compared to textile. Incentives from the Turkish government 
played a key role, which encouraged Turkish firms that were experiencing rising wages 
in Turkey and looking for a site for production to move to Ethiopia as well as Turkish 
subsidiaries in Egypt to relocate to Ethiopia given the political instability in Egypt 
(Staritz et al. 2016).12 At this time, the Development Bank of Ethiopia extended the 
70/30 investment loan offer to foreign investors. Close diplomatic relations between 
Turkey and Ethiopia also played a key role, with the Ethiopian ambassador, who is now 
Prime Minister of Ethiopia, active in country marketing and business negotiations. 
 
Ayka Addis is the largest of the integrated Turkish firms, employing around 7,000 
workers. It accounted for the majority of apparel exports in mid-2016, which went to 
the European market, especially Germany. The company still has an apparel factory in 
Turkey that does cutting and sewing of complex and fashion products, but spinning, 
knitting, dyeing, printing and basic apparel manufacturing is done in Ethiopia using 
domestic and imported cotton due to limited local availability. The arrival of Ayka 
Addis in 2007, as the first large-scale integrated producer successfully exporting to 
Western markets, increased the visibility of Ethiopia as a location for foreign direct 
investment in apparel (Staritz et al. 2016).  
 
By 2016, there were six Turkish integrated textile mills, two apparel factories, and one 
accessories producer of narrow fabric. The biggest projects include Ayka Addis, 
SayginDima, Etur, Selendawa, and Else. The Turkish firms aimed for exports, but many 
now also produce fabric for the domestic market. These Turkish textile firms source 
cotton locally, but getting access to cotton was more challenging than they expected. 
Some of them invested in ginneries in order to secure higher quality cotton fibers.13 
                                                            
12 Turkish textile firms have locations generally in three tiers: Isanbul, eastern part of Turkey which is 
cheaper than Istanbul but still quite well developed and close by, and low cost locations for the lower 
value apparel production. The latter used to be Egypt and Syria, but the productivity of labor and political 
instability made these countries difficult, and Ethiopia became an alternative (Staritz et al. 2016). 
13 Report on the Ethiopian textile and apparel industry, 2014, accessed from the Ethiopian Textile and 
Garment Manufacturers’ Association, Addis Ababa, June 2016. 
 




There were problems recently and several of these Turkish firms were closing in 
December 2016. Several sources within the apparel sector commented that SayginDima, 
Else, and Selendawa had gone bankrupt and the Development Bank of Ethiopia was 
taking them over. Another source within the government indicated that Else and Ayka 
Addis had stopped paying back their investment loans, and that Else was producing 
only for the domestic market. The Bank decided that these firms must export and do it 
through the Bank so that exports could be deducted from their debt, and forced them to 
do so for a year. Complications around these issues appear to have led to the defaulting 
on the loan and the Development Bank of Ethiopia taking over the firms.14 Hence, Else, 
SayginDima, and Selendawa are closing down, but Ayka Addis is staying.  
 
The government encouraged all firms in the textile and apparel sector to export. Firms 
had to submit their export plans on an annual basis, show commitment that they were 
striving to export, and meet certain export targets to which government incentives were 
coupled, such as access to finance from the Development Bank of Ethiopia on better 
terms than offered by commercial banks. Foreign firms were only allowed to sell up to 
20% of their production in the domestic market. However, these rules were not always 
enforced, or uniformly enforced. The government put more pressure on foreign firms 
than local ones to export, and even with foreign firms, exporting seems to have been 
enforced only when other issues were at stake, such as financial obligations. This was 
probably because the government had limited mechanisms with which to enforce 
exporting, short of shutting down the firms, which was not in the government’s 
interests, as these firms contributed to increasing the dynamism of the apparel 
manufacturing sector. As a result, the government modified its policies to encourage 
apparel exports, which we refer to as the second phase of industrial policy. 
 
Trying to solve constraints on apparel exports: industrial policy phase 2 
 
The textile and apparel sector remained a priority in the government’s first Growth and 
Transformation Plan 2010/11-2014/15. The initial targeting of the sector and 
encouragement of local investment had been undertaken without a full understanding of 
the apparel global value chain and what was required to enter and remain competitive. 
The government thought that locally available textile could be used for apparel export 
production, but most of the inputs into apparel production for export had to be imported 
for two reasons. First, many buyers nominate the textile mills that their apparel 
suppliers have to use in order to ensure conformity of products among their diverse 
suppliers, regardless of whether the supplier CMT or full package is (responsible for 
sourcing inputs). Second, the existing textile mills in Ethiopia did not produce the kinds 
                                                            
14 SayginDima was a joint venture with the government, but the government was not happy with its 
performance and pulled out in 2014; the Turkish owners struggled to find the financing to buy out the 
government shares, and then part of the factory was burned down during the political instability in 
October 2016. 
 




of fabric or the level of quality required for knit or woven apparel demanded by buyers, 
and the Turkish textile firms, which did produce export quality fabrics, generally did not 
sell their fabric to other firms. Furthermore, there were no local accessory supplier 
firms. This situation is typical in countries new to the apparel global value chain, where 
local firms enter first by just doing the assembly stage, and foreign investors come to 
assemble apparel in low cost countries. Many local investors were not aware that this is 
how the apparel global value chain operated, and thus that they would have to start with 
CMT and use imported inputs, nor was the government aware. In this buyer driven 
value chain, buyers dictate prices and other requirements, and apparel firms do not get 
orders unless they accept these buyer demands.  
 
As a result, the government created the Ethiopian Textile Industry Development 
Institute (TIDI) under the Ministry of Industry in 2010, a specialized agency for the 
sector that could provide support to local apparel and textile firms. TIDI was involved 
in finding a practical system for apparel export firms to be able to import the inputs 
without paying duties, which existed to protect the domestic market from cheaper 
imports of both fabric and apparel. In September 2012, the government passed the 
Export Trade Duty Incentive Schemes Act which created several schemes that exporting 
firms can use to avoid paying duties on imports that form components of manufactured 
exports. They include a duty drawback scheme, a voucher scheme, a bonded warehouse 
factory, a bonded export factory, and bonded warehouse for inputs. The duty drawback 
scheme involves more capital being tied up, as the firm has to pay import duties and 
then claim them back once it has exported, so most firms do not use this system. Instead 
they use the voucher scheme, in which firms do not pay import duties, but at the end of 
the year they reconcile inputs and outputs through a complex system involving an input-
output coefficient for every product. TIDI has a technical committee that calculates 
these coefficients. Firms then submit to the Customs authority its export documents at 
the end of the year, and the Customs’ voucher section compares. If the firm shows a 
higher level of wastage than the coefficient, the firm has to pay duty and taxes, and a 
penalty because it is assumed the ‘missing’ materials were sold on the domestic market. 
The system is complex, but deters importing inputs duty free and then selling on the 
domestic market. The bonded export factory is meant to control foreign direct 
investments. This means that a factory is recognized as a customs territory: the Customs 
authority checks and registers inputs going in and out. With the bonded warehouse 
factory, only the warehouse is bonded. 
 
The government also devised policies to influence resource allocation to priority sectors 
and exporting, some of which are positive incentives and some of which are negative 
ones. For example, if one of the local firms that received the DBE investment loan stops 
exporting, the interest rate on the loan it has to pay back will go up to 12%. On the other 
hand, if the local firm increases the percentage of production that it is exporting, the 
interest rate on its loan will be lowered.  For example, if a firm exports 60%, it gets a 2-
 




3% deduction, and if it exports 80%, it will get a 4% deduction. Local and foreign firms 
seeking to expand their existing factories can also access special expansion investment 
loans from the Development Bank of Ethiopia in a 60-40 scheme, where the bank 
provides 60% of the cost of the expansion project. 
 
Through strongly controlled access to foreign exchange, the government can also favor 
exporting firms. In the textile and apparel sector, the government uses this to reward 
exporting firms and punish those firms only serving the domestic market. Many new 
local apparel firms emerged in the late 2000s and early 2010s, but only produced for the 
domestic market (see Table 4 below). The government used its control over access to 
foreign exchange to encourage them to engage in production for export, which has had 
some impact. Several of the local firms exporting in 2016 produced for the domestic 
market first and had only recently started exporting, and one of the reasons they gave 
for starting to export was access to foreign exchange with which they also buy imports 
for their domestic market production. 
 
Furthermore, in collaboration with donor agencies, the TIDI offered free benchmarking 
studies, salary contribution when hiring foreign experts, contributions towards the cost 
of training, and support in export marketing through sharing the cost of participating in 
major trade shows abroad and sending prospective buyers to local firms. Sixteen local 
apparel firms took part in the benchmarking study aimed at improving productivity, 
through which firms created an action plan and TIDI provided a matching grant system 
to help finance foreign supervisory and managerial personnel to help local firms 
increase their productivity.  
 
The government also put considerable effort into expanding universities to build local 
knowledge of the textile and apparel sector. The sector is dependent on graduates from 
Bahir Dar University for technical expertise in textile production, as this university has 
a long history in providing education for the textile sector. However, education in 
apparel engineering and export merchandising, critical for the apparel export sector, was 
only recently added to the curriculum of Bahir Dar University and about five other 
universities. Another challenge is that graduates lack practical knowledge and 
experience. They now do internships within firms during their degree programs, and 
often end up being employed there after graduation.  
 
Given that the country’s economy is still largely agrarian and that the apparel export 
sector is relatively new, unskilled workers employed by apparel firms lack experience in 
a factory setting in general and in apparel factories in particular. Therefore, firms must 
spend time and resources internally in training labor in basic skills. Nevertheless, labor 
productivity is still low by international standards, making labor in Ethiopia relatively 
expensive in terms of productivity even though labor costs are very low. The 
government has created vocational schools that specialize in apparel, in order to 
 




produce operators and factory workers for the sector. TIDI is training people that 
become the teachers in these vocational schools. TIDI also offers training services to 
local firms, which can send workers to TIDI for training in rooms with state of the art 
equipment.  
 
More recently, and very important to allow upgrading from CMT to full package, the 
government sought to solve problems that local firms faced in having enough working 
capital to finance the import of inputs for orders from buyers requiring full package 
services. The Development Bank of Ethiopia created a pre-shipment financing scheme 
in which firms showing orders from buyers in the form of a letter to credit can have 
access to a revolving fund in hard currency with which to buy inputs. The few local 
firms engaged in, or switching to, full package orders have just started using this 
scheme. These specific financial incentives are supplemented by general export 
promotion schemes such as the establishment of a foreign exchange retention scheme 
and an export credit guarantee scheme to avoid problems of working capital, and the 
government reduced the costs for opening letters of credit. 
 
Lastly, the government sought to attract more foreign apparel firms by directly initiating 
marketing visits to leading apparel buying and producing countries, including in Asian 
locations where transnational producers have their head offices (Staritz et al. 2016). It 
also sought to attract foreign investors through the construction of industrial parks that 
address infrastructural challenges by providing land and factory shells as well as 
electricity, water, and communication services. The idea was piloted with the Bole Lemi 
industrial park, just outside of Addis Ababa, and the Eastern Industrial Zone developed 
by Chinese investors.15 The Eastern Industrial Zone was developed in Dukem, outside 
Addis, by a private Chinese group with Chinese government support in 2007, and is 
easy to reach on a new highway road also built by Chinese contractors, which bypasses 
the old, heavy traffic road running from Addis to Dukem. Although the Zone 
concentrates on Chinese investments, there is one foreign-owned apparel accessories 
firm (labels and printing) in the Zone that is not Chinese. There are four Chinese-owned 
apparel firms operating in the Zone. 
 
The Bole Lemi industrial park, on the other hand, focuses on the textile and apparel 
sector, but also includes some leather-related manufacturers. It took five to six years to 
build the park that opened in 2015/16. It contains 20 relatively large prefabricated 
factory sheds that were built before securing investors. Factory rental rates were very 
low, and the government provided an effluent water treatment plant for the park. There 
are seven foreign-owned apparel firms in Bole Lemi: four from India (Jay, Arvind, 
Ashton, Vests), one from Korea (Shinz), one from China (C and H Garment), and one 
from Taiwan (New Wide Garment). Bole Lemi turned out to be oversubscribed, leading 
                                                            
15 For background information on Chinese special economic zones in Africa, see Brautigam and 
Xiaoyang (2011). 
 




to an expansion of the park (Bole Lemi Phase 2) that is supposed to be completed in 
2017. 
 
The foreign firms in Bole Lemi noted that their main motivations for investing in 
Ethiopia were the low labor, electricity and water costs; security and political stability; 
duty free market access to the US and EU; and government incentives for foreign direct 
investment, both from the Ethiopian government and from their home countries. These 
foreign firms generally have globally dispersed plants, focus on exporting and follow 
the typical production set up of transnational producers manufacturing low value added, 
large run products in Ethiopia on a CMT basis with head offices and often also textile 
mills abroad pursuing the higher value added activities. However, several of the foreign 
apparel firms in Bole Lemi Industrial Park have plans to also produce more complex 
products and aim to build backward linkages into textiles. This backward integration 
diverges from the typical production structure of transnational producers, and thus they 
have the potential to be more embedded and diverge from governance structures and 
firm setups typical for transnational producers (Staritz et al. 2016). 
 
Upscaling the apparel industrial park model: industrial policy phase 3 
 
During the 2000s, the textile and apparel sector grew significantly as a result of 
government incentives and support to promote the sector even though the targets 
included in the successive Development Plans were not reached, often by large margins. 
The government had higher ambitions for the sector as a driver of industrialization as 
well as bringing in foreign exchange earnings through exports and creating employment 
and incomes. The Prime Minister’s Office spearheaded a new investment strategy that 
aimed to increase manufacturing as a percentage of GDP, drive growth, and create 
80,000 new jobs. It hinged on attracting new foreign direct investment, but not just any 
kind of foreign investor. The aim was to attract lead firms in the apparel global value 
chain and to build sector specific industrial parks for them that focused on reducing 
delivery time and the costs of production. These parks also aimed to link local firms 
better with foreign investors and buyers, and to develop vertical integration within the 
country from fiber to apparel. 
 
The central idea was to have new companies located within industrial parks, in order to 
reduce the initial capital requirements and time that it takes for individual firms to start 
operations. Firms do not have to acquire land, contractors, utility services, and 
financing, as all of this is provided in the parks, reducing the start up time. The parks 
also provide government services related to customs clearance, visa, and immigration 
services, and all required licenses; residential quarters for expatriate workers near the 
park; and business centers. Additional incentives for local and foreign investors in the 
industrial parks are access to financing, 10-15 years of income tax exemption, and duty-
 




free import of capital goods. Within the parks, the Development Bank of Ethiopia offers 
long term loans, but with a shorter grace period. Foreign firms can access a loan for 
50% of the investment costs, while local investors can access a loan for 85% of the 
investment costs and also benefit from additional support with training workers and 
hiring expatriate technical staff for a period of five years. This assistance to local firms 
is supposed to be tied to performance targets, and the government will also offer help 
with marketing arrangements. Providing the facilities, assistance with financing 
investment and training is supposed to make it easier for local investors and to 
incentivize learning.  
 
The flagship textile and apparel industrial park is Hawassa industrial park, which is also 
an eco-industrial park addressing environmental and sustainability issues. The 
motivation is to avoid repeating the environmental mistakes of previous apparel 
producing countries, as well as to use the ‘eco label’ as a marketing tool in order to gain 
a competitive advantage. The Hawassa industrial park is designed with state of the art 
technology that uses 100% renewable energy and has zero discharge of treated water. 
Other industrial parks are currently under construction, with the Mekelle and 
Kombolcha industrial parks specializing in textile, garments, and leather products, while 
the industrial parks in Dire Dawa and Adama are multi-sector (Figure 1). All facilities 
in the parks are built to international building, fire and electrical standards.  
 
 
Figure 1 Map of New Industrial Parks in Ethiopia 
 
Source: Industrial Parks Development Corporation, September 2016. 
 
 
The government aims to use the industrial parks to boost employment significantly and 
placed them around the country in order to distribute employment opportunities. The 
focus on large foreign investors was strategic because they could meet multiple aims of 
 




the government at the same time: boost exports quickly, create a large number of jobs, 
and bring in knowledge and buyers to the country. Thus, they are part of a political 
agenda to increase the legitimacy of the government through economic development. 
The Industrial Parks Development Corporation, under the direct guidance of the Prime 
Minister’s Office, manages the parks. There are regular domestic flights (Ethiopian 
Airlines) to the cities where the industrial parks are located, and some of the airports are 
to be upgraded to receive international flights. 
 
The government describes this third phase of industrial policy as a change in strategy 
from reactive to proactive, in the sense that it began actively seeking certain kinds of 
investors rather than reacting to investors that approached it. In this regard, the 
government tried to attract lead firms (buyers) in the apparel global value chain to be 
anchors for each of the industrial parks focused on apparel exports, along with some of 
their transnational producers, textile mills and accessory suppliers, and to accommodate 
their needs in the design of the park. The anchor for the Hawassa park is the US 
company PVH, which owns the Tommy Hilfiger and Calvin Klein brands. The Hawassa 
park has 52 sheds, which are occupied by 16 foreign firms and three local firms. The 
foreign firms include large transnational producers such as Hirdaramani Garment (Sri 
Lanka), Indochine International (China), Wuxi Jinmao Textile (China), Busana Apparel 
(Indonesia), Sarasavi Exports (Sri Lanka), Epic Group (Hong Kong), and Raymond 
Silver Spark Apparel (India), among others. They include 10 apparel firms, two fabric 
mills, and accessories producers. Built in just nine months, the Hawassa park was 
inaugurated in mid-2016. Only a few firms started operations by the end of 2016, with 
the rest expected to start in 2017. For example, Epic Group shipped its first export 
orders in May 2017. The Hawassa park alone is expected to generate 60,000 jobs and $1 
billion in exports by the end of 2017. 
 
The Mekelle industrial apparel park is under construction. The government sees H&M 
as the anchor for this park; however, H&M is not as involved in the park as PVH is with 
Hawassa, but rather is encouraging its existing suppliers to invest in Mekelle. H&M has 
been in Ethiopia since 2012, and initially planned to source from local firms, but there 
were few local firms at the time that could meet their standards, so H&M began 
sourcing from foreign firms as well, including those recently set up in the Bole Lemi 
industrial park. Some of H&M’s suppliers have already set up operations in Mekelle, 
not waiting for the park to be finished. These include the Dubai firm Velocity Apparelz, 
which constructed a large vertically integrated denim manufacturing firm, and DBL, 
one of the largest Bangladeshi apparel firms. These firms should start operations in 
2017, and together they aim to employ 14,000 workers. 
 
News reports and interviews with the key advisor in the Prime Minister’s Office 
indicate that the anchor of the Adama apparel industrial park is Chinese conglomerate 
Jiangsu Sunshine Group. There is no news yet of investors in the Kombolcha industrial 
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apparel park, which is under construction, but a small industrial area has merged on the 
outskirts of the town near the railway station (under construction) that includes a few 
textile and apparel firms, including a new locally owned firm and a denim jeans factory 
owned by Kanoria, an Indian firm that set up a denim textile factory in Bishoftu (not far 
from the Chinese Eastern Industrial Zone).  
Local investors were invited to submit a proposal for the Hawassa, Mekelle, and 
Kombolcha apparel parks, where sheds have been reserved for local firms. For example, 
in the Hawassa park, 8 out of the 52 sheds were reserved for local firms. According to 
the Prime Minister’s Office, the government received 23 proposals for the Hawassa 
park and held a meeting with these interested local investors in mid-2016. It is not clear 
how many local investors continued with the process, but only three local investors will 
have sheds in the Hawassa park. One of them is an existing apparel export firm that has 
had problems remaining in exporting and currently does not export, and the other two 
investors are new to the sector.16 In interviews with local firms, we asked the owners if 
they had applied for a shed in the new industrial parks. Most of them had not. They 
indicated that they planned to expand in their existing location rather than relocate. 
Some complained about the high rental cost of the shed, but others indicated that the 
price was reasonable. A few firms mentioned that they would apply for a shed in the 
Kombolcha or Mekelle parks, which are closer to the Djibouti port.  
The key advisor in the Prime Minister’s Office and officials at TIDI stated that an 
objective of the current industrial policy in the sector is for local firms to learn from 
foreign firms in the industrial parks. A key linkage could be foreign firms 
subcontracting orders to local firms, which requires that local firms reach the quality 
standards and efficiency levels of the foreign firm, often with its active assistance in 
designing production and management processes. But it remains to be seen how many 
local firms will be located in the parks, and how the linkages between local and foreign 
firms will develop. 
Cost and delivery time are crucial for firms to be competitive in the apparel global value 
chain. Time and cost to import and export are high in Ethiopia compared to competitor 
countries in Asia. For example, time to export in Ethiopia was 44 days, compared to 
28.3 days in Bangladesh, 21 days in China and 17.1 days in India; and cost to export 
was $2380 in Ethiopia, compared to $1281 in Bangladesh, $823 in China and $1332 in 
India.17 To reduce transport costs and the long time of importing and exporting that 
firms in Ethiopia face, the industrial parks are to be connected to the Djibouti port by an 
16 We were unable to get a list of the local firms from the Industrial Parks Development Corporation in 
November 2016, which stated it did not yet have the list. The information presented here comes from 
interviews with locally owned firms. 
17 Report on the Ethiopian textile and apparel industry, 2014, p.30, accessed from the Ethiopian Textile 
and Garment Manufacturers Association, Addis Ababa, June 2016. 
 




electric-driven railway system. The railway line from Djibouti to Addis Ababa was 
commissioned in mid-2016, but was not yet operational in December 2016. The Awash 
to Mekelle line is under construction and halfway completed, and the Modjo to 
Hawassa line is expected to be completed in 2018. 
 
Throughout these three phases of industrial policy in the textile and apparel sector, the 
goal has always been to generate foreign exchange and employment as well as spur 
industrialization, but the focus and instruments of industrial policies changed over time. 
In the beginning, industrial policy focused on local firms as well as local value added 
and linkages from cotton to textile and apparel. Later the focus shifted to foreign direct 
investment as a means to increase exports and employment quickly, and industrial parks 
catered to the needs of global buyers and transnational producers. The importance of 
locally owned firms learning from foreign firms and the creation of local linkages 
between cotton, textile, and apparel are still mentioned by the government. However, it 
remains to be seen to what extent local firms are supported in the new industrial parks, 
and whether linkages between foreign and local firms develop without any explicit 
government directives or support.   
 
Overview of the Ethiopian Apparel Export Sector 
 
By 2016, the textile and apparel sector included four spinning mills, 15 
weaving/knitting mills, 16 vertically integrated textile and apparel firms, and 49 solely 
apparel firms, making a total of 84 firms overall and 65 firms involved in apparel 
production.18 Table 2 provides an overview of all of the firms in the textile and apparel 
sector as of June 2016, including ownership and type of production. These figures 
include only one of the firms in the Hawassa industrial apparel park, which was already 
operating in 2016. Ownership is quite diversified in the Ethiopian textile and apparel 
sector, made up of different types of locally owned firms (see below) and a variety of 
foreign owned firms.  
 
A total of 36 foreign owned firms operated in the textile and apparel sector, including 
11 textile mills, eight integrated textile and apparel firms, and 17 apparel firms. These 
foreign firms were mostly exporting, although several also produced for the domestic 
market and a few produced only for the domestic market. China is the largest investor in 
terms of number of firms, accounting for 12 firms (which are however small compared 
to other foreign firms), followed by Turkey (eight firms), India (six firms), Korea (three 
firms), Pakistan (two firms) and Israel, Italy, Japan, Sri Lanka, and Taiwan with one 
firm each. These shares will change markedly in the near future when the new industrial 
parks are fully operational. Employment-wise, the latest industrial survey on medium 
and large enterprises employing at least 10 persons estimates that textile and apparel 
                                                            
18 Eight handwoven (or cultural clothing) firms are not included in the list. 
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account for roughly 56,000 persons employed in 2013/14.19 This figure is similar to data 
obtained from TIDI, which suggests that the textile and apparel sector had around 
55,000 direct employees in 2016.20 
Table 2 Overview of Firms in the Textile and Apparel Sector, June 2016 
Ownership Total 
Textile  
(spinning & weaving/knitting) 
Integrated  
(textile & apparel) 
Apparel 
Ethiopia 48 8 8 32 
Foreign 36 11 8 17 
China 12 7 1 4 
Turkey 8 1 5 2 
India 6 1 1 4 
Korea 3 3 
Pakistan 2 1 1 - 
Israel* 1 1 
Italy 1 1 
Japan* 1 1 
Sri Lanka 1 - - 1 
Taiwan 1 - - 1 
Total 84 19 16 49 
Source: Based on data from Ethiopian Textile Sector Profile, TIDI, January 2016. The data was 
confirmed by fieldwork information from firms and sector institutions. This data was compared to an 
excel sheet on textile and apparel firms directly accessed from TIDI. There were minimal discrepancies, 
but the excel sheet showed 50 Ethiopian-owned apparel firms, compared to 23 in the Sector Profile and 
confirmed in fieldwork. As the existence of these additional Ethiopian-owned firms could not be 
confirmed, we did not include them in Table 2.  
*Note: The Israel and Japan firms are joint ventures with an Ethiopian partner but the foreign partner
seems to be dominant in business decisions.
With regard to exports, according to UN Comtrade data for 2015, apparel exports were 
modest and remained largely flat at around US$1 million until the mid-2000s, and then 
climbed to around $12 million by 2010. Since then, they continued to rise substantially 
and accounted for around US$68 million in 2014. In 2015, they declined slightly (-4%), 
reaching US$66 million in 2015. The overwhelming majority is accounted for by 
knitted apparel (HS61), valued at US$57 million or 86% of total apparel exports in 
2015. There is no complete data available yet for 2016 from UN Comtrade, as not all 
importing countries have reported, but even the incomplete data shows already a large 
increase in apparel exports. Textile exports accounted for US$49 million in 2014 and 
also declined by -28% reaching US$35 million in 2015, including US$14 million in 
19 Central Statistical Agency, Report on Large and Medium Scale Manufacturing and Electricity 
Industries Survey, Statistical Bulletin, August 2015, Addis Ababa. 
20 Ethiopian Textile Sector Profile 2016, TIDI, January 2016.
 




cotton yarn, US$13 million in made up textiles, and US$5 million in knit fabric. Hence, 
in 2015, textile and apparel exports together accounted for US$101 million, down from 
the peak of US$117 million in 2014 (Figure 2). Data from the Ethiopian Revenue and 
Customs Authority (accessed through TIDI) show similar developments, with total 
apparel exports reaching US$72 million in 2014/15 and textile exports US$26 million 
(including 4.6 million cultural clothing), accounting together for US$98 million. After 
years of high growth rates, there was also a decline of -12% between 2013/14 and 
2014/15.  Differences are accounted for by two factors: difference in reporting periods, 
and different reporting measures being used (imports reported in partner country versus 
exports reported by Ethiopia).  
 
 
Figure 2 Ethiopia’s Apparel and Textile Exports, 2000-2015 
 
Source: UN COMTRADE (2017). 
 
The domestic market remains important, not only for local firms but also for foreign 
firms, even though the government aims at pushing particularly the latter group solely 
into exporting. This attractiveness is related to a 96.6 million population with an 
increasing share of consumers, but also to protection of the domestic market. The 
importance of the domestic market is also demonstrated by high apparel imports, 
particularly from China, accounting for US$469 million in 2015, which increased on 
average 31% annually over the past five years (Figure 3). Textile imports are also 
important and have increased over the past five years, with an annual increase of 25%, 
accounting for US$675 million in 2015 (Figure 3). Textile inputs are used for the 
domestic market but also for apparel exports, with many firms using imported yarn and 
fabric. According to data from the Ethiopian Revenue and Customs Authority, the trade 
balance is negative in all segments, including yarn, fabric, apparel, and cultural 
clothing, accounting in total for -517% (in terms of exports) in 2014/15. This increased 
 




from around -350% in the previous years. The negative trade balance is largest in fabric 
(1332% in 2014/15), followed by yarn (-519%) and then apparel and cultural clothing (-
419%).21  
 
Figure 3 Ethiopia’s Apparel and Textile Imports, 2000-2015 
 
Source: UN COMTRADE (2017). 
 
Export markets are very concentrated. Regarding apparel, the major end markets for 
Ethiopian exports are the EU-15, which accounted for 63% of total exports in 2015. The 
bulk of these exports go to Germany (49%) and Austria (7%). The EU-15 share 
decreased, however, from almost 73% in 2014. The US market accounted only for 28% 
in 2015, which increased from 18% in 2014 (Table 3). There is no complete data 
available for 2016 from UN Comtrade, as not all importing countries have reported yet. 
But the US has reported imports, which show a drastic increase from US$18.5 million 
in 2015 to US$34 million in 2016. Hence, the US end market share will increase again 
in 2016. Other important albeit smaller end markets in 2015 included the UK, Poland 
and Switzerland. Textile exports go primarily to Turkey, which accounted for 51% of 
textile exports in 2015 and has increased since the mid-2000s. In contrast, the share of 
the EU-15, which historically accounted for more than 90% of textile exports, has 
decreased to around a third. The lion share of textiles going to Turkey and China are 
made up of cotton yarn and, in Turkey’s case, also of knitted fabric, while made-up 
textiles dominate exports to the EU-15. Regional exports play a very limited role, which 





                                                            
21 There are some discrepancies in UN Comtrade data and TIDI data but the trends are similar. 
 




Table 3: Top 5 end markets of apparel and textile exports 
 ‘00 ‘04 ‘07 ‘10 ‘13 ‘14 ‘15 ‘00 ‘04 ‘07 ‘10 ‘13 ‘14 ‘15 
 Apparel               
World 1 5 6 12 66 68 66              
EU-15 0 1 1 5 48 49 42 83,2 17,3 12,6 41,3 72,5 72,8 63,3 
Germany 0 0 0 3 39 40 32 0,2 7,3 0,7 27,7 59,5 59,3 49,0 
United States 0 4 5 7 10 12 19 1,1 78,9 84,0 54,5 15,8 17,7 28,0 
Austria 0 0 0 0 6 6 5 0,8 0,4 0,1 2,9 8,6 8,7 7,1 
United Kingdom - 0 0 0 1 2 2 0,0 0,3 0,5 0,1 2,2 3,5 2,8 
Italy 0 0 0 1 1 0 2 28,8 2,2 3,5 8,9 0,8 0,5 2,4 
Textile               
World 2 9 14 23 45 49 35        
Turkey 
 0   4   7   18   22   
25  
 18  1,3 21,5 23,8 55,3 43,2 51,2 51,4 
EU-15  5   8   12   8   12  17   11  82,3 41,4 43,3 25,3 23,9 35,2 32,3 
Italy  1   2   3   3   7   5   5  17,2 8,8 10,5 9,0 12,7 9,5 13,8 
Germany  0   2   3   3   4  11   4  1,8 8,0 11,7 7,9 7,1 22,5 12,3 
China  0   1   0   2   13   5   3  0,0 2,7 1,5 7,1 25,8 9,8 8,8 
Norway 0 0 0 0 - 0 1 0,0 0,0 0,2 0,0 0,0 0,2 2,8 
Source: UN COMTRADE 2016; apparel represents HS92 61+62; textile represents HS92 50-60+63; 
exports represent partners' imports.  
 
 
The Ethiopian textile and apparel industry mainly produces cotton-based products such 
as cotton yarn, cotton fabrics, bed sheets and blankets, and cotton-based apparel. 
Focusing on the apparel segment, exports are concentrated in basic relatively low unit 
value knit, cotton-based items and show a high degree of concentration. Cotton t-shirts 
accounted for around 35% of total apparel exports in 2014, followed by cotton women’s 
trousers (18%) and cotton shirts (6%). There was no woven product category among the 
top-10 products in 2014. Export product concentration is relatively high compared to 
Asian and also other Sub-Saharan African countries. In 2014, the top five products 
accounted for almost 70% of total apparel exports. Unit values were relatively low, with 
a median price of the top five products of US$8.8 per piece (Table 4). With regard to 
the two key end markets, product concentration is high in both markets, with the top 10 
products accounting for 92% in the EU-15 and for 88% in the US. All of the top 10 
products for the EU-market in 2014 were knit items, while there were four woven items 










Table 4: Top-10 apparel export products (2014) 






610910 T-shirts (N/A, cotton) 23,733 35% 4.3 
610462 Trousers (W&G, cotton) 12,563 18% 5.6 
610510 Shirts (M&B, cotton) 4,413 6% 8.8 
611430 Garments (N/A, MMF) 3,924 6% 14.0 (US$/kg)  
611030 Jerseys (N/A, MMF) 2,703 4% 10.5 
Average 47,336 69% 8.6 
Median     8.8 
620343 Trousers (M&B, synthetic) 2,240 3% 12.5 
610469 Trousers (W&G, other textiles) 2,227 3% 7.9 
610463 Trousers (W&G, synthetic) 2,127 3% 7.7 
610444 Dresses (N/A, artificial) 1,729 3% 13.7 
610990 T-shirts (N/A, other textiles) 1,673 2% 5.1 
Average 57,332 84% 9.0 
Median     7.9 
Total   68,408 100%   
Source: UN COMTRADE 2016. 
 
 
In 2015, textile and apparel exports were characterised by a high concentration of a few 
large firms. According to ETGAMA, only 30 to 35 firms export, with 30 further firms 
having the potential to export. One foreign-owned integrated firm accounted for more 
than 50% of exports; five to six large firms accounted for the next 20% of exports; and 
the other 20% came from the rest of the exporting firms. This composition will change 
in the next years given the large foreign direct investments in the industrial parks. 
According to firm-level TIDI export data, the share of foreign firms in exporting 
increased continuously, accounting for 82% of total textile and apparel exports in 
2014/15. As Figure 4 shows, the share of local firms declined from around 50% in 
















Figure 4 Textile and Apparel Exports by Local and Foreign Firms 
 
Source: Ethiopian Textile Sector Profile 2016, TIDI, January 2016. 
 
Mapping the locally owned firms  
 
Out of a total of 84 firms in the apparel and textile sector in January 2016, 48 were 
Ethiopian-owned firms, consisting of eight integrated textile firms, eight integrated 
textile and apparel firms, and 32 apparel firms. Table 5 lists all of these firms and 
indicates the year they were established, their ownership type and whether they were 
exporting in 2016 and had previously exported. These 48 local firms include a range of 
ownership types: nine previously state-owned firms of which only two are still state-
owned22; one firm that belongs to the Endowment Fund for the Rehabilitation of Tigray 
(EFFORT), which is linked to the TPLF and thus considered a party-owned firm; one 
firm that is part of Al-Amoudi’s MIDROC group; and the remainder are owned by 
individuals or groups of local investors, including four Ethiopian diaspora-owned firms 







                                                            
22 The other four previously state-owned firms were privatised to foreign investors or are joint ventures 
with a dominant foreign partner.  
23 This group includes Ethiopians who have lived abroad for a long time and returned to Ethiopia in the 
1990s or 2000s. They kept the citizenship of the country in which they were living, and only acquired a 






























































Table 5 Ethiopian-owned Textile and Apparel Firms, 2016 






Adama Spinning Private 2008 Export 
(yarn)  
 
Alemgena Spinning Private 2013 No  
Crown Weaving Weaving/knitting Private 2008 No  









SOE, Privatized  No  
Firke Factory Weaving/knitting 
(socks) 
Private 2009 No  
KK  Weaving/knitting 
(blankets) 
Private  1992 No  
Tehute Knitting 
and Garment 
Weaving/knitting Private  2011 No  
Bahir Dar Integrated textile  SOE 1961 Export  
Kombolcha Integrated textile  SOE 1986 Export  
Yirgalem Integrated textile & 
garment 
SOE, Privatized 1969, 2010 Export  
Dire Dawa Integrated textile  SOE, Privatized 1947, 2007 Export 
(yarn) 
 
Awassa Integrated textile  SOE, Privatized 1989, -- Export 
(yarn/fabric) 
 
ArbaMinch Integrated textile  SOE, Privatized 1991, -- Export 
(yarn/fabric) 
 
Akaki Garment Garment SOE, Privatized  1971, 2004 No  
Gulele Garment Garment SOE, Privatized 1983, 2005 No Yes 
Addis Garment Garment SOE,  
Privatized (foreign), 





Almeda Textile Integrated textile & 
garment 
EFFORT 1994 Export   
Edget Garment Private 1996 No  
EMD Garment Private  1996 No  
Ambassador Garment Private 1997 No  
Adugna Kebelay Garment  Private 2000 No  
MAA Garments Integrated textile & 
garment 
MIDROC Group 2004 Export  
GMM Garment Private 2004 Export  
Knit to Finish Garment Private, diaspora 2004 Export  
Yonis Garment Private, diaspora 2004 Export  
Eltex Garment Private 2004 Export  
Novastar Garment Private, diaspora 2005 Export  
GG SuperGarments Garment Private 2005 No Yes 
Vitcon Garment Private 2005 No  Yes 
Yabets Garment Private 2005 No  
 




Haile Garments Garment Private 2006  No Yes 
Asbm Garment Private 2006 No  
Feleke Garment Private 2006 Export  
Concept Garment Private, diaspora 2006 Export  
Oasis Garment Private 2007 No Yes 
Wossi Garment Private 2007 No Yes 
Mantel Garment Private 2007 No  
Abem Garment Private 2008 No  
Toto Garment Private 2008 No  
Desta Garment Private 2009 Export  




Garment Private 2011 No  
Big M Garment Private 2011  No  
Lucy Garment Garment Private 2011 Export  
Hay Garment Private 2012  No Yes  
EDE Garment Private 2013 No  
Rainbow Garment Private 2013 No  
Source: Compiled by the authors based on data from TIDI and interviews. 
 
 
As Table 5 shows, 18 out of the 48 firms were engaged in exporting in 2016. However, 
Adama, Dire Dawa, Awassa and ArbaMinch exported only yarn or yarn and fabric, and 
thus we have not included them in our list of local exporting firms, as we are interested 
only in firms exporting apparel or made-up textiles. The 14 exporting firms include 
firms that started out purely exporting as well as firms that started out producing for the 
domestic market and only later shifted into exporting. Some of the firms that started out 
exporting were not successful, as mentioned above, and shifted to producing entirely for 
the domestic market. Of the 14 exporting firms, 12 of them produced for the domestic 
market as well as for exports; hence only two firms were engaged only in exporting.  
 
Most of the 13 state-owned textile and apparel firms had been privatized to local and 
foreign investors by the mid-2010s (see Table 1). In general, the privatized integrated 
textile firms had a large gap in technology and thus very low productivity or even 
defunct machines, and the new owners had to invest in renovations, which required time 
and money, before the firms could export competitively. Many of the privatized firms 
bought by local investors struggled with accessing investment finance, including from 
the Development Bank of Ethiopia. The two remaining state-owned textile firms, on the 
other hand, had easy access to investment finance at zero interest through the Ministry 
of Public Enterprise. Four out of the seven firms privatized to local investors were 
exporting in 2016: Yirgalem, Dire Dawa, Awassa and ArbaMinch. The new owner of 
Yirgalem renovated the knitting and dyeing facilities and expanded the apparel factory, 
and the firm has begun slowly to export basic cotton knit products using its own fabric. 
 




Dire Dawa exported yarn to China and Italy, but otherwise focuses on sales of yarn and 
fabric to the domestic market. Awassa and ArbaMinch exported a small and declining 
share of yarn and fabric. Hence, Yirgalem is the only previously state-owned integrated 
textile firm bought by a local investor that has set up an export quality apparel factory 
and pursued exports. Two of the four firms privatized to foreign investors export 
apparel, with one being a joint venture where the foreign partner is dominant. 
 
None of the previously state-owned apparel firms are exporting. The local investor in 
Gulele Garment tried exporting, but did not succeed and is currently producing for the 
domestic market. Akaki Garments has the same owner as GG Super Garments; the 
owner is trying to export with GG and uses Akaki to produce only for the domestic 
market. Addis Garments was privatized to an Italian investor, who exported between 
2007 and 2013 to an Italian buyer for different end markets, but also produced for the 
domestic market. It switched to the domestic market entirely in 2013, before being sold 
in 2016 to the owner of Abem Garments, a locally owned firm that produces for the 
domestic market. 
 
Two state-owned integrated textile firms remain, which according to the management of 
these firms, the government was not able to sell and thus adopted the strategy of making 
them profitable and encouraging them to export. Bahir Dar Textiles was privatized to 
Turkish owners in 2004, but then the government terminated the contract and reacquired 
it in 2006 due to problems with the investors.24 The government invested in major 
renovations of Bahir Dar and Kombolcha Textile firms between 2008 and 2012. The 
two SOEs are both vertically integrated textile mills producing woven fabric and made-
up textiles (bedsheets and towels), largely for the domestic market but with an 
increasing export share. Bahir Dar only started exporting made-up textiles in 2015, so 
its export share is lower than that of Kombolcha, which began exporting made-up 
textiles in 2010. 
 
Almeda Textile is part of EFFORT, the Endowment Fund for the Rehabilitation of 
Tigray. The CEO of EFFORT is Azeb Mesfin, the wife of the former Prime Minister 
Meles Zenawi. EFFORT has firms involved in a large number of industries, such as 
construction, cement production, transport logistics, leather, pharmaceuticals and cotton 
production.25 Almeda Textile is a vertically integrated textile and garment firm that 
contains both woven and knit facilities, which is not typical for textile firms as they 
usually specialize in woven or knit. Established in the 1990s, EFFORT decided to make 
Almeda large, and thus have both woven and knit textile production as well as made-up 
and apparel products, because it was intended to provide employment for former TPLF 
liberation fighters in and around the town of Adwa (Tigray region). Almeda exports, but 
                                                            
24 There was a similar experience with Yirgalem, which was leased to a Turkish investor but then the 
government took it back, and it was later sold in 2010 to a local investor. 
25 EFFORT Investments Company Profile, 2015/16. 
 




also produces branded t-shirts and other knit and woven products for the domestic 
market.  
 
MAA Garments and Textile Factory is part of Kebire Enterprises, which also includes 
Tkur Abay Shoe factory, Hilltop Hotel, and Debrehirhan tannery. Kebire Enterprises is 
part of the MIDROC Group owned by Mohammed Hussein Al-Amoudi, but it has 
independent management. MAA Garments is located in Mekelle, and is a large 
vertically integrated textile and apparel company specialized in knit fabric. Other firm 
owners and observers of the industry often refer to MAA Garments as being in a similar 
situation as Almeda Textiles, in that the main motive behind MAA Garments is to 
provide employment in the Tigray region and that MAA Garments enjoys a special 
political status with the government.  
 
Almeda Textile, Bahir Dar Textile, Kombolcha Textile, and MAA Garments are the 
largest locally owned firms in terms of the number of workers employed. They are also 
all vertically integrated and engage in exporting to some extent, although the two SOEs 
only export made-up textiles. The remaining local firms can be categorized in terms of 
their date of establishment and export or domestic market orientation. The first category 
includes local firms established in the 1990s, before industrial policy to promote 
exports, and which focused on the domestic market. The second category is firms 
established in the mid-2000s, as a direct result of industrial policy, with an initial export 
focus. The third category contains firms established in the 2000s and early 2010s, 
benefiting from domestic market protection but also attempting to export. Most of these 
firms are located in Addis Ababa or surrounding towns in the Oromia region. Notably, a 
new local firm engaged in exporting was established in Kombolcha (Amhara region) in 
late 2016, which is not included in Table 5. It is likely that the new apparel industrial 
parks will encourage local investment in those areas of the country. 
 
Regarding the first category of apparel firms established in the 1990s, prior to the 
government’s proactive industrial policy, this group of firms still produces only for the 
domestic market. The exception may be Ambassador, which is trying to enter the 
regional market and set up retail shops in Uganda. Ambassador produces its own brand 
of men’s suits with imported fabric from China and India, and sells them (along with 
shirts and accessories) through 22 company-owned stores in Ethiopia and 66 agent 
shops. The firm is pursuing regional exports as a way to increase sales, but also, and 
perhaps more importantly, to increase its ability to access foreign exchange with which 
to import its fabrics. 
 
The government’s first attempt at industrial policy to promote apparel exports led to the 
establishment of many locally owned apparel firms in the first half of the 2000s, 
including Knit to Finish, Novastar, Concept, GG Super Garments, Feleke, GMM, 
Asbem, Haile Garments, Oasis, Vitcon, Yonis, and Wossi. As can be seen from Table 5, 
 




several of these firms are no longer exporting. While some of them see their firms as 
only temporarily out of the export market, others have given up on the export market. 
One of the firms has up to now only exported to the regional market and is now trying 
to enter the US and EU markets. 
 
From the mid-2000s, a number of local investors entered apparel production for the 
domestic market. Many of these local firms have continued to produce only for the 
domestic market, but a few of them did seek out export markets eventually and in 
diverse ways. For example, Lucy Garments produces its own brand of men’s formal 
shirts and has retail stores, but entered production of different products for export in 
2015 in order to increase its ability to access foreign exchange and to be able to learn 
from their export activities. Eltex has been involved in apparel production for the 
domestic market since 2004, and is vertically integrated in knit production, but during 
an expansion phase in 2014 decided to enter exports. Desta started in 2008 with a 
knitting factory, and later in 2013 entered apparel production both for the domestic 
market and export. Both Desta and Eltex aim to improve their fabric production through 
investment in new machinery in order to be able to use their own material for export 
products. In 2016, Hay was positioning itself to enter export markets with its own 
fabric, by upgrading and expanding its production facilities in order to meet export 
standards. 
 
Among the local firms that produce only for the domestic market and have never 
exported and do not plan to do so, some of them focus on providing uniforms for 
businesses and the government using woven fabric produced by textile firms in 
Ethiopia. The others produce casual clothes, suits and formal men’s shirts, and 
children’s clothes, and sell to wholesalers who have a distribution system in the country.  
 
Given that the domestic market is lucrative and is said to generate higher profits than 
exporting, most local firms still aim to also export – why is this the case? This is related 
to government incentives and support linked to exporting that firms aim to access, as 
well as priority in accessing foreign exchange for firms that export. The latter 
‘incentive’ is more pressing for local firms that have a business strategy where they 
produce apparel using imported fabrics. For these firms, being low in the foreign 
exchange queue is a problem. In contrast, firms that produce uniforms and workwear 
using woven fabric sourced locally are not constrained by access to foreign exchange. 
The profit margin is high on these products because the local firms can use locally 
produced fabric, the standards are lower, and the risk is lower in terms of delivery 
deadlines.  
 
But local firms also enter the export market as a means to increase their capabilities. As 
export products are generally more complex and have higher quality standards than 
products for the domestic market, firms can also learn new production techniques. The 
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higher volumes achieved through exporting can also lead to higher productivity. 
Furthermore, local firms generally do CMT production for exports while they produce 
full package or original design manufacturing for the domestic market, and hence can 
learn from the designs they get from global buyers  to produce new products for their 
domestic market business. 
Almost all of the local exporting firms straddle the domestic and export market. They 
all report that their profit margins in exporting are low due to their low productivity 
(vis-à-vis international standards) combined with low prices set by buyers; most of them 
are just breaking even or losing money. The local exporting firms have to produce 
apparel for the domestic market while they are learning how to meet the cost, quality 
and delivery standards and investing in their physical facilities in order to meet 
productivity and quality as well as social and environmental standards. In sum, local 
firms see the value of exporting in terms of learning, but learning is a costly process and 
the prices set by buyers do not allow for a margin of error; therefore, firms use the 
domestic market as a means to subsidize the cost of learning to compete. The financing 
schemes from the Development Bank of Ethiopia, while important, did not sufficiently 
account for the costs of learning. Although DBE did allow debt on the local firms’ 
investment loans to be rescheduled, when it became clear that the local firms were not 
competitive and could not repay the loans, the firms still needed a source of further 
capital including working capital without taking out more loans. This working capital 
came, at least partly, from producing for the domestic market or from other business 
activities in the case of owners having diversified businesses. The dangers, of course, 
are never moving from the comfort of the domestic market to the rigors of the export 
market, as well as not using the buffer of the domestic market and related profits for 
investments in learning and capability building. Additionally, some local firms predict 
that the domestic market will not remain protected indefinitely, and thus they must 
become internationally competitive not only for accessing export markets but also to 
retain their position in the domestic market.  
Conclusion 
The EPRDF government’s pro-active industrial policy in the textile and apparel sector 
played an important role in the emergence and growth of apparel exports. Industrial 
policy targeting the sector evolved over time, with the government seeking to change 
strategies in response to mistakes and experiences as well as political imperatives to 
deliver jobs and increase exports as quickly as possible. The first phase of industrial 
policy focused on incentivizing local investment in apparel production for export, but 
both the government and the local investors underestimated what was involved in 
entering the apparel global value chain. Thus, the results from the local firms were 
modest, as it takes time for new export firms to build capabilities and become 
 




competitive. Already in the first phase, the government was encouraging foreign direct 
investment in the sector, but it did so in a rather ad hoc way. The government learned 
from this first phase of industrial policy that there were constraints in the sector that had 
to be addressed in order to help local firms learn and it realized how the global value 
chain worked, which also led it to revise its strategy of attracting foreign direct 
investment. It turned to specialized industrial parks as a way to address industry-wide 
constraints and to support new investors to start exporting quickly. It also focused on 
foreign investors as a way to not only increase exports rapidly, but also to bring 
production and marketing knowledge into the country. The current phase of industrial 
policy, centered on the creation of several industrial parks, aims to attract large scale 
foreign investments as well as to foster linkages between local and foreign firms as a 
means to facilitate learning and capability building among local firms. However, the 
exact measures taken by the government to foster these linkages remain to be seen, as 
such linkages will not necessarily emerge without active government involvement. 
 
The EPRDF government has simultaneously pursued policies of export promotion and 
import-substitution in the textile and apparel sector. As a result, there are apparel firms 
producing for the domestic market, including both local and foreign firms, which buy 
some fabric locally. Some of these firms produce only for the domestic market, and 
many firms that are exporting also produce for the domestic market—especially those 
that are not located in the industrial parks dedicated to exports. The domestic market 
apparel industry includes workwear but also local brands and locally owned retail 
chains, especially in men’s formal shirts and suits. The government’s dualistic policy 
has helped the development of apparel exports by local firms, by allowing local firms to 
subsidize the cost of entering the export market with high prices garnered in the 
domestic market, but also might be constraining it, by reducing the incentives for local 
firms to undertake the hard process of developing the capabilities required to compete. 
On the other hand, import substitution is an important means of saving foreign 
exchange and creating jobs, and can create backward and forward linkages in the 
economy. Therefore, the challenge for industrial policy is to retain the focus on local 
firms given their important role in productive transformation and to ensure incentives 
and support for local firms to export, and through this to increase their capabilities and 
value added, despite the existence of a protected domestic market. 
 
The objective of the AfriCap research project is to understand the effects of industrial 
policies on incentivizing local firms to invest in building capabilities in order to export, 
as well as other channels through which local firms can learn such as foreign direct 
investment spillovers and buyer-supplier relations in global value chains. The first step 
in this research is to understand the emergence and evolution of the sector, and thus 
who are the locally owned firms, when and why did they emerge, and the features of the 
broader textile and apparel sector in which they emerge. In the case of Ethiopian apparel 
exports, industrial policy has played a key role and will remain crucial, ideally in 
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combination with incentivizing foreign direct investment linkages and spillovers and 
buyer-supplier relations to ensure learning and competitiveness of locally-owned firms. 
In contrast, in the case of Madagascar apparel exports (the second country where the 
apparel export sector is studied for this project), industrial policy is largely missing, 
except in the beginning in the form of creating the export processing zone. Therefore, in 
Madagascar foreign direct investment and buyer-supplier relations are potentially even 
more important channels for local firms to emerge and build their capabilities. The 
possibilities for using foreign direct investment as a basis to build linkages with, and 
capabilities at, local firms will depend on several factors, which include pro-active 
industrial policy by the government to facilitate these linkages as well as the type of 
foreign investors, their business strategies, and the specific global value chains in which 
they are integrated.  
The second step in the AfriCap research is to define what technological capabilities are 
required to enter and become competitive in the apparel global value chain, and then to 
assess locally owned firms using this benchmark of required capabilities. In the Ethiopia 
apparel case, we conducted a survey with all of the 14 local exporting firms, which 
captured data across a range of indicators on different types of technological 
capabilities. The survey results are presented in Whitfield and Staritz (2017), which 
continues the discussion of the tasks involved in becoming international competitive 
and the processes through which the local exporting firms are building capabilities. The 
third step, which is still ongoing, is to assess how and why local firms build capabilities 
through conducting in-depth firm histories with a strategically selected sample of local 
exporting firms.  
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